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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at analyzing whether environmental 
management systems can spur innovation at firm level, by 
providing new empirical evidence on the relationship between 
EMAS (Eco Management and Audit Scheme) and patented 
innovation. In applying a Negative Binomial model with Fixed 
Effect, we estimate the number of granted patents using EMAS 
as key explanatory variable. The relationship between EMAS 
and innovation is studied by using an original panel database 
composed by 30439 European firms belonging to all sectors and 
size. Moreover, we use an original instrumental variable to 
control for potential endogeneity. The analysis reveals that 
EMAS is positively correlated with innovation at firm level, 
although the results vary across countries and sectors.  
 
Keywords: Innovation; Environmental management systems; Patents; Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
Environmental Management Systems (EMSs) are considered a promising type of 
environmental policy instrument finalized to increase the environmental awareness of 
firms and to reduce their environmental impact. EMSs are implemented voluntarily by 
private firms, however worldwide environmental authorities strongly encourage their 
adoption through subsidies and technical support. The European Commission provided 
since the 1993 the official European EMS, the Eco Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS), to certify firms adopting well defined eco-management practices. 
The number of EMAS registered sites has been constantly increasing over time (about 
38% over the last ten years in UE27) as well as the academic effort to explore potential 
impacts of its implementation at sectoral and at firm level, with particular attention to 
the impact on innovation (e.g. Wagner, 2007; Rennings et al., 2006; Frondel et al., 
2008; Horbach, 2008; Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009; Demirel and Kesidou, 2011). 
According to the existing literature, several advantages are associated with EMSs 
implementation: Molina‐Azorín et al. (2009) analyze the literature related to the EMS’ 
impact on firms’ financial performance, noticing that studies where a positive impact of 
environment on financial performance is obtained are predominant. Iraldo et al. (2009) 
show the positive impact of EMSs on environmental performance and on self-reported 
technical and organizational innovations. Hering et al. (2012) demonstrate the positive 
impact of EMS implementation on exports; Lan et al. (2012) find a positive impact of 
EMS on human capital. Morrow and Rondinelli (2002) highlight the importance of the 
reputational effect of EMS implementation as well as the improvements in terms of 
energy efficiency; Dasgupta et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence that the EMS spurs 
regulatory compliance. 
However, in some countries
1
, the growing concern about the long-term profitability of 
EMSs on competitive markets, the perceived absence of economic returns associated to 
the costs of EMSs implementation and the absence of a strong signaling on the market 
(Hillary, 2004; Morrow and Rondinelli, 2002; Massoud et al., 2010), caused a 
slowdown in new registrations and in some cases provoked a drop of certified firms. 
Technological innovation is a key factor for achieving a better environmental 
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 German certified sites were 1830 in 2003, while decreasing up to 1212 in 2012. In Sweden, certified 
firms were 115 in 2003 but only 55 in 2012. A smaller decrease in Austria: from 298 in 2003 to 255 in 
2012. Finally, in UK from 75 certified sites in 2003, only 48 certified sites are registered in 2012. 
performance and for ensuring competitiveness of firms
2
, however, it is controversial 
whether the EMS can spur innovation. It is not clear indeed whether the positive 
correlation between innovation and EMS often found in the literature is (at least 
partially) due to the fact that more innovative firms are also more likely to be certified 
because there are (unobserved) factors spurring both innovation and EMS adoption. 
Existing literature often lacks of longitudinal dimension (e.g. Frondel et al., 2008; 
Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009) as well as cross country comparison (e.g. Horbach, 2008; 
Demirel and Kesidou, 2011) and mainly rely on self-assessed innovation and self-
reported degree of EMS implementation. Furthermore, the empirical evidence is not 
conclusive: apparently, the EMS correlates differently with innovation according to 
specific types of innovation considered (Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009; Frondel et al., 
2008) or according to the specific EMS considered.  
In order to overcome at least some of the limitations of previous studies, this paper 
relies on a database of 30439 European firms from 24 different countries, that collects 
data from 2003 to 2012. We consider EMAS as a specific and highly requiring EMS for 
several reasons: firstly because it is the official European EMS, secondly, because it 
entails a number of core activities common to all firms and clearly defined, but 
proportioned to their size, and finally because strong empirical evidence on its impact 
on innovation at firm level over time is scarce. 
 This paper uses the count of granted patents to identify innovation at firm level 
(Wagner 2007). The literature on this topic makes a limited use of patent data (Wagner, 
2009). Patents are a very noisy indicator of innovative activity but however they 
provide comparable measure of innovative outcomes (across time and countries). The 
results of our investigation reveal that EMAS is effective in fostering innovation at firm 
level. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the relevant literature, 
Section 3 develops the relationship between EMAS and innovation. Section 4 concerns 
the data source and the methodology. We present our econometric results in Section 5; 
Section 6 concludes. 
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 See for instance Costantini and Mazzanti (2012), Cainelli (2008); for a critical review on the 
relationship between innovation and firms’ performance see Brusoni et al. (2006). 
2. Literature review 
The EMS can be defined as “an organizational change within firms based on the 
adoption of management practices that integrate the environment into production 
decisions, identifying opportunities for pollution and waste reductions, and 
implementing plans to make continuous improvements in productions methods and 
environmental performance” (Khanna and Anton, 2006). EMAS3 similarly to all EMSs 
has a core of activities, entailing the publication of a periodical environmental report, 
the definition of management activities finalized to establish continuous environmental 
improvements, and the periodical assessment of outcomes, according to the scheme 
“Plan-Do-Check-Act”. EMAS has its own guidelines, and the third party audit allows 
firms to obtain the certification or its renewals over time.  
A number of empirical studies have attempted to identify the determinants of innovation 
at the firm level, and whether an EMS could be considered one of them. Several papers 
indeed introduce the EMS as a key explanatory variable of innovation, however, the 
majority of these studies are based on self-assessed data on innovation and do not take 
into account the magnitude of introduced innovations, because they measure only the 
presence or not of any innovative behavior. 
Demirel and Kesidou (2011) introduce a measure of the innovative effort by using the 
amount of the environmental investments undertaken by British firms. They investigate 
the determinants of different types of eco-innovation, such as the end of pipeline 
pollution control technologies, the integrated cleaner production technologies and the 
environmental R&D. The paper introduces among the determinants of eco innovation 
the internal firm level motivations, namely the organizational capabilities of firms, in 
particular the presence of any EMS. The econometric results show that the EMS is 
effective in motivating firms to undertake investments in end of pipeline green 
technologies and in environmental R&D, but it is not effective in increasing R&D 
expenditure of firms that already perform green R&D. Finally, the variable EMS does 
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 EMAS was drawn by the European Commission with Reg. CEE 1836/93, in the context of the Fifth EU 
Environment Action Programme 'Towards Sustainability'. EMAS was originally restricted to companies 
in industrial sectors but since 2001 it has been open to all economic sectors including public ad-
ministrations. A second version of EMAS (EMAS II) was adopted by European Commission with Reg. 
761/2001, and a further implementation was drawn with Reg. 196/2006. The ultimate revision (EMAS 
III) has been published in 2009 (Reg. 1221/2009); it subsumes previous regulation, and entered into force 
on 11 January 2010. 
 
not show any effect on the Integrated Cleaner Production technologies related 
investments.  
Some limitations concerning the potential reverse causality between EMS and 
environmental innovation have been solved by Frondel et al. (2008) that find no effect 
of EMS on pollution abatement innovations. This paper addresses the issue of the 
relationship between EMSs and environmental innovation performance by modeling a 
recursive bivariate probit model that allows for 899 German firms' decision on 
innovation activities and EMSs adoption to be simultaneous. The econometric 
estimation reports no significant effect of the EMS as a determinant of abatement 
technological innovations.  
An attempt to analyze the reverse causality between EMSs and innovation has been also 
performed by Ziegler and Nogareda (2009). The aim of the paper is to analyze whether 
the adoption of an EMS or other environmental assessment activities in 368 German 
manufacturing firms during 2003 can be explained as (partially) dependent on the 
adoption of any technological environmental innovation implemented over the years 
2001-2003. The paper considers both formal and informal management systems. The 
results demonstrate a positive effect of environmental innovation on the adoption of 
EMSs, but according to the authors this conclusion can be challenged because omitted 
underlying firm heterogeneity could not be controlled in a cross-sectional framework, 
i.e. their estimation could be biased by the absence of control for characteristics that 
affect both the adoption of an EMS and the implementation of technological 
environmental innovations. 
Cross sectional databases are very common in this branch of literature, though a panel 
approach could solve the unobserved heterogeneity problem concerning innovative and 
certified firms; an exception is represented by Horbach (2008). This paper overtakes the 
difficulties related to the use of cross-sectional data, by relying on two different panel 
databases
4
. The econometric results of the first analysis confirm a positive role of the 
environmental management tools in determining the adoption of an environmental 
innovation in the two previous years. The environmental innovation is self-assessed by 
firms and it is limited to a binary variable that does not take into account the magnitude 
of the innovative performance. The paper reports a second analysis using the MIP panel 
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 The establishment panel of the Istitute for Employment Research (IAB) and the Mannheim innovation 
panel (MIP). 
wave 2001, collecting data for 4846 firms in the manufacturing and service sectors. The 
paper considers any change in the organizational structure (which includes the 
introduction of EMS, but in a generic sense, e.g. any management system, even 
informal) and shows a positive effect on innovation measures. 
Another problem often encountered in this literature is represented by the definition of 
EMS that is adopted. Sometimes a very inclusive definition of organizational changes is 
considered, like in Horbach (2008) and Frondel et al. (2008), and this introduces wide 
heterogeneity in the environmental effort declared by firms. Antonioli et al. (2013) 
study the relationship of complementarity between organizational changes and training
5
 
on environmental innovations, finding no complementarity when the objective 
considered is the adoption of EMAS/ISO standards. Rennings et al. (2006) narrow to 
the EMAS certified firms their analysis, trying to focus on a specific EMS and its 
characteristics as potential determinants of innovation. The study considers EMAS 
validated manufacturing German facilities to investigate the impacts of different 
characteristics of EMAS on technical environmental innovations and economic 
performance. The main results concern the importance attributed by firms to the 
learning processes entailed by the certification and the maturity of EMAS (measured as 
two revalidations obtained) in determining environmental process and products 
innovation. Similarly, Inoue et al. (2013) find a positive effect of the maturity of 
ISO14001 on innovative performance of 1499 Japanese firms in 2003. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3. Why EMAS should foster innovation? 
This paper asks whether EMAS affects the probability of European firms to develop 
new patents. Recent literature seems to agree that a positive, even if weak, effect of 
EMSs on less tangible assets of firms such as reputation and innovativeness apply 
(Wagner, 2007; Rennings et al., 2006). Wernerfelt (1984; 1995) suggests that EMS 
adoption fosters the development of strategic resources and competitive advantages 
which have a positive influence on firms’ innovative capabilities (Wagner, 2007). 
However, this positive correlation does not prove causality, and the dynamics between 
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 High Performance Work Practices (HPWP) and Human Resource Management (HRM). 
EMSs adoption and innovative behavior can be better investigated with longitudinal 
data which allow for controlling for unobserved characteristics of firms (Ziegler and 
Nogareda, 2009).  
The development of knowledge is a cumulative process and can have a positive impact 
on future innovative performance (see Baumol, 2002); Rennings et al. (2006) 
demonstrate the importance of learning processes by EMSs in developing 
environmental product innovations, though the study was limited to certified firms and 
does not provide a comparison with non-certified firms’ performance. Indeed, EMS 
implementation can result in a new internal source of knowledge, and, at the same time, 
it can bring externally sourced knowledge, based on cooperation with other certified 
firms and partners. The complementarity between internal and external knowledge has 
been widely investigated as a determinant of innovation development (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006; Caloghirou et al., 2004; Arora and Gambardella, 1994). 
The organizational structure of firms can make the introduction of innovations more 
likely or more difficult, and the adoption of well-designed EMSs can improve 
innovative performance. A characteristic of EMSs is that they provide permanent 
incentives for further reductions of the environmental impact. Even though EMAS has 
been defined a “medium swords” program (Potoski and Prakash, 2005) because it does 
not sanction shirkers, it nonetheless entails periodical monitoring and annual public 
disclosure of the environmental performance of adherents
6
. Certified firms have to 
monitor their activities and improve their performance under several indicators. In 
particular EMAS firms monitor six key indicators introduced by the latest EMAS 
version (EMAS III, Reg. CE 1221/09): 1. Energy efficiency; 2. Raw material efficiency; 
3. Water (use); 4.Waste; 5. Bio diversity; 6. Emissions
7
.  
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 See for example the environmental performance (Iraldo et al., 2009; Daddi et al., 2011), or the economic 
performance, among others, Khanna and Damon (1999) that analyze the impact of another “medium 
sword” program (the “33/50 US Program”) and its impact on short and long run profitability of firms, 
finding a positive effect on long run profitability.  
7
 The EMAS specific technical indicator are: Total direct energy use: total annual energy consumption, 
expressed in MWh or GJ. Total renewable energy use: percentage of total annual consumption of energy 
(electricity and heat) produced by the organisation from renewable energy sources. Annual mass-flow of 
different materials used (excluding energy carriers and water): in tonnes. Total annual water 
consumption: in m3. Total annual generation of waste: in tonnes. Total annual generation of hazardous 
waste: in kilograms or tonnes. Use of land: in m2 of built-up area. Total annual emission of greenhouse 
gases (incl. at least emissions of CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6): in tonnes of CO2 equivalent. 
Total annual air emission (incl. at least emissions of SO2, NOx and PM): in kilograms or tonnes. 
The persistent gain in efficiency is a challenging achievement, and forces firms to take 
advantage from the best technologies available on the market, and eventually to develop 
innovation to provide the improvements needed by the EMAS.  
The required compliance with the EMAS can be assimilated to the duty to comply with 
mandatory environmental regulation. A broad strand of the literature analyzes the 
relationship between stringent environmental regulation and innovation, partially driven 
by the theoretical framework of the Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; 
Horbach et al., 2012, Rennings and Rammer, 2011). Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find that 
increasing the environmental regulatory compliance expenditure influences positively 
general technical innovation. Similarly, Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) find that 
environmental innovation responds to increases in pollution abatement expenditures.  
Rennings et al. (2006) argue that, even though market-based instruments are generally 
considered those with the highest dynamic/innovation efficiency with respect to 
command and control regulation, standards can be more effective in stimulating 
environmental innovation in situations characterized by strategic behaviors of firms 
(i.e., when the impact of one’s own activities on other firms are taken into account). 
Although EMAS is a non-mandatory policy instrument, it is a standard; it entails 
environmental expenses and can be assimilated to stringent environmental regulations. 
Therefore, we expect a positive effect of EMAS on innovation. 
This analysis uses patent data to address the research question, namely whether EMAS 
improves innovative performance of European firms. The count of patented innovations 
captures an objective and comparable measure of innovation and reveals how much a 
firm is innovative. So far, the use of patent data to investigate the relationship between 
EMSs and innovation is still limited; to our knowledge only Wagner (2007) addresses 
the issue of the link between EMSs and environmental innovation performing a patent 
analysis.  
 
4. Database and methodology 
4.1 Database 
The analysis is based on a unique database originating from different sources. We 
started from Amadeus database that provides us a random sample of 40000 European 
(EU27) firms. We then merged the list of 40000 firms with those contained in the 
EMAS Register
8
, updated to 2012, in order to identify certified firms, merging at first 
tax code and company name information and then checking the complete 
correspondence with the full address. At the end of 2012 it was made up by 4502 firms 
and contains information on registered sites, number of employees, date of the first 
registration, NACE code and environmental verifiers responsible for the accreditation. 
From the EMAS register we excluded public administrations. We also use data on 
Environmental Expenditure on GDP from Eurostat
9
. 
We merged financial data for the whole list of firms from 2003 to 2012 and patent 
portfolio data from the Amadeus database. We obtained a final panel spanning from 
2003 to 2012, reporting observations on 30439 European firms. 
The sample is composed by firms from eight different industries plus a residual 
category: 1. Infrastructure, 2. Trade 3. General Services, 4. Knowledge Intensive 
Business services (Kibs), 5. High Tech Manufacturing, 6. Medium Tech Manufacturing, 
7. Low Tech Manufacturing, 8. Agriculture and 9. Others. 
Table 2 shows the sample composition by sector. SMEs among EMAS are prevalent 
(about 53% of small firms and about 30% medium size firms). Table 3 displays the 
composition by country. It can be underlined that EMAS certified firms in the sample 
are mainly in Spain (38.48%) Germany (25.34%) and Italy (12.91%). Table 4 shows 
that the highest concentration of EMAS certifications is in medium and low tech 
manufacturing sectors.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Innovative firms represent 10.36% of the sample (firms with at least one granted 
patent), among them, more than a half is concentrated in the Medium tech and Low tech 
manufacturing sector. Not surprisingly, the sector in which the percentage of innovators 
is the highest is the High tech manufacturing sector. EMAS certified firms seems to be 
more innovative with respect to non certified firms, as the percentage of EMAS with at 
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The European EMAS Register, provided by the European Commission, is available on line and yearly 
updated (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/register/) 
9
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 
least one patent in their portfolio is 23.7% against 9.6% of innovative firms in non 
certified firms group. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
In our sample, 1082 EMAS firms obtained EMAS certification before 2003, while 810 
became EMAS during the period 2003-2012. Table 6 summarizes the number of new 
registrations per year. The peak of new certifications is between 2006 and 2009. In the 
same years, as shown by Graph 1, the growth rate of patents of EMAS group has a fall, 
after which there is an increase. One possible explanation can be that the majority of 
EMAS firms are SMEs, with limited resources, and it could be that while investing in 
the new implementation of EMAS, no or few resources were devoted to R&D and 
patenting activities. However, once EMAS is established, it can affect positively 
innovative performance and spurring the growth rate of patents over the growth rate in 
patented innovations of the non EMAS, as well as the whole sample trend. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
[Graph 1 about here] 
 
4.2 Variables and methodology 
The positive correlation between EMAS and innovation does not automatically imply 
causality. A reverse causality problem can be identified: innovation can spur the 
implementation of EMSs, or the decisions of firms to develop innovation and to adopt 
EMAS are considered at the same time. Some characteristics of firms affecting EMAS 
i,t-1 as well as PATENTS i,t variables are likely to be correlated with unobserved factors 
relegated into the error term. The endogeneity source resides therefore in omitted firm 
specific variables. 
To deal with these issues, we use panel data, we lag of one year the explanatory variable 
EMAS i,t-1, we introduce fixed effects, we control for dynamic country and sector 
specific trends, and we finally use an instrumental variable. 
The model we estimate is: 
 
PATENTS i,t = αi + β1 EMAS i,t-1 + β2 Z i,t-1 + Ɛi (1) 
 
where PATENTS i,t is the dependent variable, EMAS i,t-1is the key explanatory variable 
and Zi,t-1 represents several control variables. 
The dependent variable PATENTS i,t report the number of granted patents in the year by 
each firm in the sample. The independent variables have been chosen for the analysis on 
the base of prior empirical literature, provided their availability on our database (see for 
instance Wagner, 2008; Demirel and Kesidou, 2011; Horbach et al., 2008; Frondel et 
al., 2008). The explanatory variable related to our research question is the dummy 
EMAS i,t-1; it equals zero for never EMAS firms and it becomes equal to 1 for certified 
firms, from the year of the accreditation if this happens during the ten years covered by 
the panel, or stays equal to 1 from the first year of the panel if the accreditation has been 
obtained before the 2003.  
Wagner (2007) argued that a certification dummy is a relatively weak measure for EMS 
implementation, especially because it contributes to raise the reverse causality issue. 
Unfortunately, our data do not include a measure of implementation degree; however 
EMAS implementation presents a minimum level of implementation irrespective of size 
and sector of activity, guaranteed by local environmental authorities that support private 
environmental verifiers in conceding the accreditation. This should ensure 
comparability of the effort and of the degree of implementation.  
As a further attempt to control for the reverse causality, EMASi,t-1 is lagged of one 
year
10
. According to Rehfeld et al. (2007), using a lag of the explanatory variable seems 
of limited effectiveness; they find a high correlation of environmental innovations 
carried out in the past and planned for the future. Thus there should be high correlation 
between plans related to past and future environmental innovation and EMSs adoption. 
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 As a further attempt to test the effect of the adoption of EMAS we introduce several lags in the 
Negative Binomial model. Here we report the coefficients (st. err. in parenthesis): EMASi,t-2: 0,091* 
(0,021); EMASi,t-3 : 0,607* (0 .286) and EMASi,t-4 : -0.350 (0.244). 
However, this is not automatically true for generic innovation that appears to be less 
correlated with environmental expenditure planned and linked to the implementation of 
EMSs. Nonetheless, we control for PASTINNO i,t-1 of firms, calculated with the 
perpetual inventory method (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007)
11
.  
We include several control variables (Z i,t-1) such as the number of employees 
(EMPLOYEES i,t-1) and past profits (expressed as share of turnover, PROFIT i,t-1) to 
take in account size and past financial performance of firms. We also introduce the 
share of GDP devoted by countries each year to the environmental expenditure (ENV 
EXP i,t-1), as an attempt to control for country specific effects on innovation. This index 
should help controlling the trend in new certifications that could be generated by 
country specific environmental regulation. All these variables are lagged of one year. 
Other control variables included are YEAR dummies, to capture period trend effects, and 
the interactions between years and country dummies for the major countries in the 
sample. Wagner (2008) tries to reveal an effect of EMS interacted with country 
dummies, but does not find any significant impact. Nevertheless, a dynamic effect of 
country specific characteristics, such as regulation, domestic market characteristics, 
intellectual property rules and enforcement, and many others, cannot be excluded 
therefore we include COUNTRY*YEAR interaction term.  
Finally we control for sector specific dynamics by interacting years and sector 
dummies. We do not have information on R&D carried out by companies, but, on one 
hand we know from the literature that for SMEs the R&D missing data should be more 
correctly read as zero R&D expenses, since R&D investments are strictly correlated 
with size (Brunneimer and Cohen, 2003; Shefer and Frenkel, 2005). On the other hand, 
we know that the propensity to innovate strongly depends on industries. Firms' 
technological capabilities are more likely to be highly developed in science based and 
production intensive sectors, in which innovative mechanisms can represent a 
competitive opportunity to gain market share. Moreover, in these sectors the 
possibilities of technological improvements are higher than in other industries, and this 
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 Past innovation is estimated using the perpetual inventory method: 
 
Past Innovation(t)= (1-δ)patent stock(t-1)+patent flow(t) δ=0.10 
 
where patent stock denotes the patents portfolio of firms and patent flow is the number of patents granted 
in year t. 
allows for a concentration of high skilled employees and a higher R&D expenditure. 
Therefore we try to control at least at sector level for R&D effort by introducing the 
dynamic SECTOR*YEAR interaction term. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
4.3 Instrumental Variable 
With the approach followed so far, the endogeneity issue has not been completely ruled 
out. We expect the variable EMASi,t-1 to be correlated with the error term of the main 
regression. To produce a consistent estimation of the EMASi,t-1 coefficient therefore we 
introduce an instrumental variable. A valid instrument lets us isolate a part of EMASi,t-1 
that is uncorrelated with the errors in our main regression, and that part can be used to 
estimate the effect of a change in EMAS on innovation. We use the variable 
VERIFIERS as instrument: it represents the number of private environmental verifiers 
per country over the period covered by the panel. This instrumental variable has never 
been used before to our knowledge and represents an innovative contribution of this 
study. 
The EMAS regulation establishes that in each country there must be private experts or 
companies charged with public environmental authorities to verify the existence of 
EMAS requisites to grant the certification. Since they are private consultants, they are 
interested in proposing their services to firms: they attend a specific training to become 
verifiers and, after that, they propose to firms their competences, by presenting the 
advantages to become EMAS certified. Therefore, they foster EMAS adoption and 
spread the information among local firms. Their presence in European countries has 
been overall increasing over time, even. At the end of 1998 environmental verifiers 
were 262; at the end of 2014 they reached the number of 411 operating in European 
Union. A larger number of environmental verifiers means a greater promotion on the 
territory of EMAS, a greater availability of opportunities to start the procedure of 
accreditation and, eventually, a larger number of firms that decide to adopt the 
certification. 
The variable VERIFIERS is correlated with the decision of firms to implement EMAS, 
however it is not correlated with the decision to develop or not patentable innovation. It 
can be noticed that the number of verifiers and its trend it's exogenous to country 
specific innovation policies, since it is not determined by any public incentives or 
subsidy and it is totally dependent on the voluntary choice of private experts that obtain 
a specific environmental qualification and try to exploit it on the market. Therefore we 
estimate the model: 
 
PATENTS i,t = αi + β1 ȆMASi,t-1 + β2 Z i,t-1 + Ɛi (2) 
 
where ȆMASi,t-1 is the predicted value obtained using the instrument VERIFIERS. We 
estimate the IV Poisson model, whose results are shown in Table 11. The model 
estimates the parameters of a Poisson regression model in which some of the regressors 
are endogenous and it is suitable to model nonnegative count outcome. We use the 
Control-function estimator that, as described by Wooldridge (2010), uses functions of 
first-stage parameter estimates to control for the endogeneity in the second stage.  
 
5. Empirical results  
The decision to undertake an environmental certification is a deliberate choice of firms 
and does not have the characteristics of a randomly assigned variable. It could be that 
highly productive firms can have enough resources to result into both patents and 
environmental certifications. Therefore, we control for unobserved time invariant 
individual heterogeneity by using a Fixed effects model, in particular we rely on the 
Negative Binomial Fixed effects estimation. 
Table 8 presents the Negative Binomial
12
 performed on the whole sample as well as the 
Poisson model. The most important finding of this analysis is that the variable EMASi,t-1 
shows a positive and significant coefficient, being therefore effective in spurring 
innovation at firm level. The result holds when controlling for COUNTRY*YEAR and 
SECTOR*YEAR interaction terms, as robustness check. For these models we calculate 
the Incidence Rate Ratios. A variation of one unit in the EMASi,t-1 variable, i.e. from 0 
to 1 in the case of EMAS, is associated with a patent count increase of 1.299 in the 
dependent variable for the first regression, an increase of 1.2101 in the count dependent 
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 The Negative Binomial model seems to fit better if compared with the Poisson model, for some 
reasons. The sample mean is 0.21 whereas the sample variance is 4.32, so there is overdispersion. The test 
for overdispersion confirms it (coeff. 7.66*** SEs 1.77).  
variable in the second estimation and an increase of 1.276 in the third estimation. Past 
innovation, as well as firms' size, positively influences innovation, while it seems that 
previous period financial performance does not exert any significant impact. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
We replicate the model for countries subsamples and for sector based subsamples, in 
order to exploit possible heterogeneities. Models from 3 to 6 (Table 9) illustrate the 
results obtained for Italy, France, Germany and Spain, singularly considered. Only the 
regressions related to Italy and Germany show a positive and significant impact of 
EMASi,t-1, while the regressions on Spanish and French firms seem overall less 
significant. These results are worth of further consideration; in particular, the analysis 
related to such countries can be deepened with the introduction of the national 
regulatory framework in the model, to better understand the factors that differentiate 
German and Italian firms among the other European firms. 
Table 10 (models from 7 to 11) show the results for the following sectors: High tech 
manufacturing, Medium tech manufacturing, Low tech manufacturing, Kibs and Other 
services. 
An interesting hypothesis can be put forward by looking at the sector based analysis: 
EMAS i,t-1 is positive and significant for sectors characterized by low knowledge 
intensity, while it does not have any impact on firms belonging to high (and medium) 
technological sectors. A possible explanation for this can be that EMAS exerts a 
different impact across sectors and that does not spur innovation "per se", but it is 
effective in fostering innovation mainly for those sectors in which the R&D expenditure 
is originally low and not very frequent, while the impact is not significant whenever the 
sector is characterized by strong R&D activities. Firms with low level of internal R&D 
could take advantage from EMAS by adding competences and routines to their existent 
knowledge, as a source of external knowledge with potential complementarity or 
substitution effects with other sources of knowledge creation. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
This study corroborates the results on the relationship between EMAS and innovation 
introducing an original instrumental variable (Table 11). The estimation with ȆMAS i,t-1 
confirms the findings of the main model: ȆMAS i,t-1 is significant, positive and 
comparable with the estimations using not instrumented EMASi,t-1. In this case the 
Incidence Rate Ratio for ȆMAS i,t-1 is 1.82. The result is robust to the introduction of 
the COUNTRY*YEAR and SECTOR*YEAR interaction terms, even if the magnitude of 
the coefficient progressively reduces.  
The model is just-identified, and this does not allow to test over identifying restrictions, 
however we test the weakness of the instrument that rejects H0 of weak instrument 
(Wald: chi2(1) = 62.71 , p-value= 0.0000). The parameter ρ measures the strength of the 
endogeneity of EMASi,t-1 ; in our estimation ρ =19.45*** (robust s.e. 1.32) confirming 
the endogeneity of EMASi,t-1. 
 
 [Table 11 about here] 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper analyzes the impact of EMAS on patented innovation in European firms. 
The panel analysis has been performed on a sample composed by 30439 European 
firms, and considers a period of ten years (from 2003 to 2012). 
We find that EMAS positively affects the number of granted patents; however, this 
result is particularly strong in Italy and Germany and in low tech manufacturing sectors 
and services. We address the issue of endogeneity with an instrumental variable 
estimation, and the results are confirmed. 
In term of policy implications this result show that EMAS is effective instrument to 
raise innovativeness of certified firms while improving their environmental 
performance. This positive effect of EMAS justifies environmental authorities’ financial 
and technical support to spur EMAS adoption, as well as certified firms’ effort. 
However, as highlighted by our analysis, EMAS is more convenient for low 
technological sectors and in some countries, providing support for the hypothesis that 
some regulatory frameworks are more EMAS and innovation friendly than others, and 
that some sectors are more suitable to exploit all the advantages of EMAS. In this 
period of scarcity of resources to devote to the environment, policymakers should 
consider to exploit EMAS potentialities adopting strategic improvements of regulation. 
On the one hand concentrating benefits and subsidies for those sectors in which EMAS 
is more effective would maximize the returns from firms and environmental authorities’ 
efforts. Additionally, innovation friendly regulations should be enriched with specific 
provisions for EMSs, as they can be considered innovation friendly as well. 
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the impact of EMAS on patents and our 
findings can further stimulate the debate on the relationship between EMSs and 
innovation. Our results can be improved in many directions. For example The number 
of granted patents does not capture the all the possible innovations developed by firms 
and probably underestimate the innovative activity of the certified firms. In addition the 
dummy EMASi,t-1does not provide a measure of the degree of EMAS implementation, 
thus allowing for some measurement errors. 
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 Table 1. Literature review 
Authors Years EMS 
Source of 
data 
Period of 
coverage 
Country Data and sectors Main findings 
Demirel 
and 
Kesidou 
2011 ISO14001 
DEFRA 
survey 
2005-
2006 
UK 
289 
manufacturing 
firms 
Not conclusive evidence: 
significant impact of EMS 
only on specific types of 
innovation 
Ziegler 
and 
Nogareda 
2009 
ISO14001
, EMAS 
telephone 
survey 
2003 Germany 
368 
manufacturing 
firms 
Positive effect of 
environmental innovation on 
EMS adoption 
 
Horbach 2008 
organizati
onal 
changes 
IAB, MIP 
survey 
2001, 
2004 
Germany 
753 firms in 
environmental 
sectors and 4846 
manufacturing and 
services firms 
Positive effect of 
organizational changes 
innovation 
Frondel, 
Horbach 
and 
Renning 
2008 
generic 
EMS 
OECD 
survey 
2003 Germany 
899 firms, all 
sectors 
No significant effect of ems 
on abatement technology 
innovations 
Rennings
, Ziegler, 
Ankele, 
Hoffman 
2006 EMAS 
telephone 
survey 
2002 Germany 
1227 EMAS 
certified firms 
Positive effect of EMAS 
maturity on environmental 
innovation 
 
Wagner 2008 
EMS and 
Ecolabel 
postal 
survey 
2001 
9 EU 
countries 
2095 
manufacturing 
firms 
Positive effect of 
ecolabelling on product 
innovation,not clear effect of 
EMS interacted with national 
regulation indexes on 
innovation 
 
Inoue, 
Arimura, 
Nakano 
2013 ISO14001 
OECD 
survey 
2003 Japan 
1499 firms 
of all sectors 
Positive effect of ISO 14001 
maturity on environmental 
R&D expenditure 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
 Table 2. Sample composition by sector 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
Table 3. Sample composition by country 
Country N firms % N EMAS % 
AT 916 3.0 43 4.6 
BE 592 1.9 16 2.7 
CY 23 0.0 23 100 
CZ 21 0.0 21 100 
DE 8905 29.2 396 4.4 
DK 652 2.1 31 4.7 
ES 5271 17.4 651 12.3 
FR 6038 19.8 66 1.0 
GB 1351 4.4 43 3.1 
GR 15 0.0 12 0.8 
IE 995 3.3 44 4.4 
IT 2497 8.2 229 9.1 
NL 305 1.0 10 3.2 
NO 385 1.3 18 4.6 
PL 21 0.0 21 100 
PT 2426 7.9 49 2.0 
Other countries 26 0.0 24 92 
Total 30439  1697  
Source: authors’ elaboration 
Sector Description N firms % 
Employees  
(mean) 
S.D. 
Turnover 
(mean) 
S.D. 
Infrastructure 
Electricity, gas supply, 
 water supply and waste management, construction, 
transportation and storage, real estate activities 
6223 20,4% 62 145.42 154.11 123.06 
Trade Wholesale and retail trade 7713 25,3% 49 109.39 128.63 204.47 
Kibs Telecommunications, R&D 2423 8% 61 136.34 152.67 188.06 
Other services 
Accomodation and food services, financial and 
insurance activities, administrative and support 
services, PA and defence, education, human health, 
arts and entertainement 
7240 23.7% 173 182.77 177.88 195.68 
High tech 
manufacturing 
Aerospace , 
Pharmaceuticals Computers, office machinery , 
Electronics-communications 
Scientific instruments 
402 1.3% 185 193.80 154.21 164.62 
Medium tech 
manufacturing 
Electrical machinery, 
Motor vehicles 
Chemicals, excluding pharmaceuticals, Other 
transport equipment ,Non-electrical machinery, 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, 
Rubber and plastic products, 
Non metallic mineral products, 
Shipbuilding , 
Basic metals, 
fabricated metal products 
2571 8.6% 213 188.22 124.25 177.12 
Low tech 
manufacturing 
Other manufacturing and recycling, 
Wood, pulp, paper products, printing and publishing 
, 
Food, beverages and tobacco, 
Textile and clothing. 
3208 10.6% 158 153.56 166.67 193.92 
Agriculture 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Mining and quarring 
410 1.3% 50 88.98 77.89 206.60 
Others 
Households and extraterritorial organizations, 
residuals (nace unknown) 
249 0.8% 65 106.29 172.07 201.81 
Total  30439 100% 99 150.43 169.24 196.48 
 Table 4. Innovative firms across sectors 
Sector 
N. of  
innovators 
(a) 
% of 
innovators 
on total 
sample 
N. of 
innovators 
and EMAS 
(b) 
(b)/(a) 
Infrastructure 247 3.9 51 20.6 
Trade 364 4.7 32 8.8 
Kibs 220 9.0 4 1.8 
Other services 283 3.9 8 2.8 
High tech manufacturing 226 56 26 0.8 
Medium tech manufacturing 1168 45.4 148 12.6 
Low tech manufacturing 619 19 111 18 
Agriculture 19 4.6 2 10.5 
Others 10 4.0 1 10 
Total 3156 10.36 403 12.7 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
Table 5. Registration over time of new EMAS firms 
Registration 
Year 
N EMAS % 
2003 40 4.94 
2004 90 1.11 
2005 50 6.17 
2006 150 18.52 
2007 110 13.58 
2008 140 17.28 
2009 70 8.64 
2010 60 7.41 
2011 60 7.41 
2012 40 4.94 
Total 810 100 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
 Table 6. Patents trend over the period 2003-2012 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
 Table 7. Summary statistics 
Variables and description  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable      
PATENTS i,t 
Number of 
granted patents 
per year 
0.208 2.098 0 100 
Explanatory variable      
EMAS i,t-1 
Equal to 1 if firm 
is certified and 0 
otherwise 
0.035 0.185 0 1 
Control variables      
EMPLOYEES i,t-1 
Number of 
employees 
76.774 159.777 1 4609 
PROFIT i,t-1 
Share of profit on 
past revenues 
3.97 14.768 -100 100 
PAST INNO  
Patent stock 
calculated with 
perpetual 
inventory method 
0.066 0.632 0 67.98 
ENV EXP t-1 
Share of GDP 
devoted to 
environmental 
expenditure 
0.323 0.135 0.11 1.31 
Instrumental Variable      
VERIFIERS 
Number of 
environmental 
verifiers in the 
country each year 
67.32716             96.04062           0 239 
Sectors (dummies)      
Agriculture  0.013 0.114 0 1 
Infrastructure  0.22 0.414 0 1 
Trade  0.242 0.429 0 1 
Kibs  0.075 0.263 0 1 
Other services  0.231 0.421 0 1 
High tech manufacturing  0.012 0.111 0 1 
Medium tech manufacturing  0.077 0.267 0 1 
Low tech manufacturing  0.098 0.298 0 1 
Others  0.031 0.173 0 1 
 
 Table 8. Negative binomial FE and Poisson FE 
 
Negative 
Binomial 
Poisson 
Neg bin Neg bin 
PATENTS     
EMAS i,t-1 0.233* 0.278* 0.186* 0.190* 
 (0.093) (0.111) (0.098) (0.097) 
PASTINNO i,t-1 0.0387*** 0.037*** 0.0381*** 0.0359*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
EMPLOYEES i,t-1 0.0479*** 0.0481*** 0.0381*** 0.0412*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0108) 
PROFIT i,t-1 0.0108 0.006 0.0212 0.0209 
 (0.0197) (0.001) (0.0209) (0.0203) 
ENV EXP t-1 -0.541+ 0.009   
 (0.308) (0.004)   
Years dummies Y Y   
Country*Year   Y  
Sector*Year    Y 
Constant -0.0832  0.306*** -0.6111 
 (0.161)  (0.0624) 0.5409 
Observations  183847 183847 183847 183847 
Wald chi2 1353.95 1323.16 1345.55 1284.37 
Log likelihood -8137.9498 -8006.1166   -8088.8942 -7887.1883 
Alpha :  20.05994   Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2 = 9.3e+04 Prob>=chibar2 = 
0.000 
IRR for EMAS:                                    1.26                 1.32                  1.20                1.21  
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001 
 Table 9. Negative Binomial FE Country subsamples 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
IT FR DE ES 
PATENTSt 
EMAS i,t-1 0.243* 0.0900 0.707*** 0.0765 
 
(0.463) (0.669) (0.188) (0.209) 
PASTINNO i,t-1 0.0490*** 0.0296* 0.0386*** 0.0271*** 
 
(0.00890) (0.0122) (0.00164) (0.00664) 
EMPLOYEES i,t-1 0.0551 0.136 0.0324** 0.0590 
 
(0.0476) (0.115) (0.0115) (0.0365) 
PROFIT i,t-1 0.0117 0.0109 -0.000117 0.00842 
 
(0.00722) (0.0113) (0.00235) (0.00721) 
ENV EXP t-1 -0.8316 5.466 2.123*** 2.631 
 
(0.9282) (4.295) (1.961) (2.516) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Constant 5.805 -7.012 -10.69*** -6.892 
 
(7.266) (5.023) (1.013) (6.447) 
     Observations 24970 60380 89050 52710 
Wald chi2 60,46 30,82 1211,64 38,94 
Log likelihood -496.25846 -233.71496 -6691.572 -650.07903 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001 
 Table 10. Negative Binomial FE, Sectors subsamples 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 high tech medium tech low tech kibs other serv 
      
PATENTS t      
EMAS i,t-1 0.0164 0.0259 1.172*** -1.005 2.187 ** 
 (0.308) (0.155) (0.301) (0.672) (0.7192) 
PASTINNO i,t-1 0.0487*** 0.0414*** 0.0430*** 0.0350*** 0.0319*** 
 (0.00568) (0.00235) (0.00412) (0.00572) (0.00375) 
EMPLOYEES i,t-1 0.00539 0.00108 0.109*** -0.0108 0.0505* 
 (0.0313) (0.0183) (0.0264) (0.0416) (0.0237) 
PROFIT i,t-1 -0.000487 0.00847* 0.00100 0.00150 -0.00384 
 (0.00569) (0.00413) (0.00608) (0.00652) (0.00354) 
ENV EXP t-1 -2.822+ -0.774 0.118 -21.18 -4.548 
 (1.589) (0.750) (1.813) (18.06) (3.023) 
Country*Years Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.923* 0.801* 0.111 11.68 2.710+ 
 (0.865) (0.392) (0.944) (9.399) (1.597) 
      
Observations 960 19260 15550 1695 22960 
Wald chi2 170,57 551,16 261,96 117,89 187,50 
Log likelihood -778.56761 -3034.7504 -1328.7994 -512.72605 -877.60243 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001 
 Table 11. IV Poisson 
 First stage 
 
Second stage 
 
   
EMPLOYEESi,t-1 0.000*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
PROFIT i,t-1 0.006** 0.016** 
 (0.000) (0.005) 
PASTINNO i,t-1 0.002*** 0.837*** 
 (0.001) 0.066 
VERIFIERSt-1 0.401***  
 (0.002)  
EMAS i,t-1  0.607*** 
  (0.050) 
Years dummies Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y 
Constant 0.091*** 0.683*** 
 (0.003) (0.037) 
R-squared                           0.4048 
LR chi2                                                                 1650.33 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001 
 
 
 
